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Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity
B>'AviNASH K. DixiT AND J O S E P H E . STIGLITZ*
The basic issue concerning production in
welfare economics is whether a market solu-
tion will yield the socially optimum kinds
and quantities of commodities. It is well
known that problems can arise for three
broad reasons: distributive justice; external
effects; and scale economies. This paper is
concerned with the last of these.
The basic principle is easily stated.' A
commodity should be produced if the costs
can be covered by the sum of revenues and
a properly defined measure of consumer's
surplus. The optimum amount is then
found by equating the demand price and the
marginal cost. Such an optimum can be
realized in a market if perfectly discrim-
inatory pricing is possible. Otherwise we
face conflicting problems. A competitive
market fuHilling the marginal condition
wouldbe unsustainable because total profits
would be negative. An element of monopoly
would allow positive profits, but would
violate the marginal condition.^ Thus we
expect a market solution to be suboptimal.
However, a much more precise structure
must be put on the problem if we are to
understand the nature ofthe bias involved.
It is useful to think ofthe question as one
of quantity versus diversity. With scale
economies, resources can be saved by pro-
ducing fewer goods and larger quantities of
each. However, this leaves less variety,
which entails some welfare loss. It is easy
and probably not too unrealistic to model
scale economies by supposing that eaeh
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potential commodity involves some fixed
set-up cost and has a constant marginal
cost. Modeling the desirability of variety
has been thought to be difficult, and several
indirect approaches have been adopted.
The Hotelling spatial model. Lancaster's
product characteristics approach, and the
mean-variance portfolio selection model
have all been put to use.^ These lead to re-
sults involving transport costs or correla-
tions among commodities or securities, and
are hard to interpret in general terms. We
therefore take a direct route, noting that the
convexity of indifference surfaces of a con-
ventional utility function defined over the
quantities of all potential commodities al-
ready embodies the desirability of variety.
Thus, a consumer who is indifferent be-
tween the quantities (1,0) and (0,1) of two
commodities prefers the mix (1/2,1/2) to
either extreme. The advantage of this view
is that the results involve the familiar own-
and cross-elasticities of demand functions,
and are therefore easier to comprehend.
There is one case of particular interest on
which we concentrate. This is where poten-
tial commodities in a group or sector or in-
dustry are good substitutes among them-
selves, but poor substitutes for the other
commodities in the economy. Then we are
led to examining the market solution in re-
lation to an optimum, both as regards
biases within the group, and between the
group and the rest of the economy. We ex-
pect the answer to depend on the intra- and
intersector elasticities of substitution. To
demonstrate the point as simply as possible,
we shall aggregate the rest of the economy
into one good labeled 0, chosen as the
numeraire. The economy's endowment of it
is normalized at unity; it can be thought of
as the time at the disposal of the consumers.
•'Sec the articles by Harold Hoiclling, Nicholas
Stern, Kelvin Lancaster, and Stiglilz.
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The potential range of related products is
labeled 1,2.3 Writing the amounts of
the various commodities as Vo and .V = (x,.
Xi, Xi . . . , we assume a separable utility
function with convex indifference surfaces:
0) U -
In Sections I and II we simplify further
by assuming that K is a symmetric function,
and that all commodities in the group have
equal fixed and marginal costs. Then the
actual labels given tu commodities are im-
material, even though the total number n
being produced is relevant. We can thus
label these commodities 1,2 n. where
the potential products (« + 1), (« + 2). . . .
are not being produced. This is a restrictive
assumption, for in such problems we often
have a natural asymmetry owing to grad-
uated physical differences in commodities,
with a pair close together being better
mutual substitutes than a pair farther apart.
However, even the symmetric case yields
some interesting results. In Section III. we
consider some aspects of asymmetry.
We also assume that all commodities
have unit income elasticities. This differs
from a similar recent formulation by
Michael Spencc, who assumes U linear in
Xo, so that the industry is amenable to
partial equilibrium analysis. Our approach
allows a better treatment ofthe interscctoral
substitution, but the other results are very
similar to those of Spence.
We consider two special cases of (1). In
Section I, V is given a CES form, but U is
allowed to be arbitrary. In Section II. U is
taken to be Cobb-Douglas. but V has a
more general additive form. Thus the for-
mer allows more general intersector rela-
tions, and the latter more general intra-
sector substitution, highlighting different
results.
Income distribution problems are ne-
glected. Thus U can be regarded as repre-
senting Samuelsonian social indifference
curves, or (assuming the appropriate aggre-
gation conditions to be fulfilled) as a mul-
tiple of a representative consumer's utility.
Product diversity can then be interpreted
either as different consumers using different




The utility function in this section is
(2) u =
For concavity, we need p < \. Further,
since we want to allow a situation where
several of the Xj are zero, we need p > 0. We
also assume U homothetic in its arguments.
The budget constraint is
(3)
where Pi are prices of the goods being pro-
duced, and / is income in terms of the
numeraire, i.e., the endowment which has
been set at 1 plus the profits of the firms
distributed to the consumers, or minus the
lump sum deductions to cover the losses, as
the case may be.
In this case, a two-stage budgeting pro-
cedure is valid.'' Thus we define dual quan-
tity and price indices
(4) > • = q = .-\/ti
where /!i = (I - p)/p, which is positive since
0 < p < 1. Then it can be shown^ that in the
first stage.
(5) y - = /{I
for a function s which depends on the form
of U. Writing (T{q) for the elasticity of sub-
stitution between XQ and V, we define ffiq) as
the elasticity ofthe function .v. i.e.. qs'{q)l





can be negative as o{q) can ex-
ScL- p. 21 of John Green.
These details and several others arc omitted to save
space, but can be found in the working paper by the
authors, cited in the references.
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Turning to the second stage ofthe prob-
lem, it is easy to show that for each /,
(7) X, - y
where v is defined by (4). Consider the effect
of a change in /?, alone. This affects x, di-
rectly, and also through q: thence through v
as well. Now from (4) we have the elasticity
^ log Pi \Pil
So long as the prices of the products in the
group are not of different orders of mag-
nitude, this is of the order ( l /«). We shall
assume that n is reasonably large, and ac-
cordingly neglect the effect of each p, on q;
thus the indirect effects on x,. This leaves us
with the elasticity
dlogx, - 1 -(1 + (i)(9) 0 log Pi (1 - p)
In the Chamberlinian terminology, this is
the elasticity of the dd curve, i.e., the curve
relating the demand for each product type
to its own price with all other prices held
constant.
In our large group case, we also see that
for / ^ j . the cross elasticity c* log xjb log p,
is negligible. However, if all prices in the
group move together, the individually small
effects add to a significant amount. This
corresponds to the Chamberlinian DD
curve. Consider a symmetric situation
where x, = x and p, = p for all / from 1
to n. We have
(10)
= xny = xi
q = pn~'^ = p
and then from (5) and (7),
(11) X =
pn
The elasticity of this is easy to calculate; we
find
(12) f* log X = - [I -
Then (6) shows that the DD curve slopes
downward. The conventional condition that
the dd curve be more elastic is seen from (9)
and (12) to be
(13) h, + Hq) > 0
Finally, we observe that for / # j .
(14)
1/(1-
Thus 1/(1 - p) is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between any two products within the
group.
B. Market Equilibrium
It can be shown that each commodity is
produced by one firm. Each firm attempts
to maximize its profit, and entry occurs un-
til the marginal firm can only just break
even. Thus our market equilibrium is the
familiar case of Chamberlinian monopolis-
tic competition, where the question of
quantity versus diversity has often been
raised.*" Previous analyses have failed to
consider the desirability of variety in an ex-
plicit form, and have neglected various
intra- and intersector interactions in de-
mand. As a result, much vague presumption
that such an equilibrium involves excessive
diversity has built up at the back of the
minds of many economists. Our analysis
will challenge several of these ideas.
The profit-maximization condition for
each firm acting on its own is the familiar
equality of marginal revenue and marginal
cost. Writing c for the common marginal
cost, and noting that the elasticity of de-
mand for each firm is (1 -I- 0)/0, we have
for each active firm:
= c1 +
Writing p^ for the common equilibrium
price for each variety being produced, we
have
(15) p, = f(l -h /3) = -^
P
^Scc Edwin Chamberlin, Nicholas Kaldor. and
Robtrl Bishop.
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The second condition for equilibrium is
that firms enter until the next potential
entrant would make a loss. If n is large
enough so that I is a small increment, we
can assume that the marginal firm is exactly
breaking even, i.e., (/)„ - c)x„ = a, where x„
is obtained from the demand function and a
is the fixed cost. With symmetry, this im-
plies zero profit for all intramarginal firms
as well. Then / = 1, and using (11) and (15)
we can write the condition so as to yield the
number/7j. of active firms:
i\t.\ •''iPe^i'^) fl
(16) = _
Equilibrium is unique provided sip^n''^)/
p^n is a monotonic function of n. This re-
lates to our earlier discussion about the two
demand curves. From (11) we see that the
behavior of s{pn~^)/pn as n increases tells
us how the demand curve DD for each firm
shifts as the number of firms increases. It is
natural to assume that it shifts to the left,
i.e., the function above decreases as n in-
creases for each fixed p. The condition for
this in elasticity form is easily seen to be
1 + mq) > 0
This is exactly the same as (13). the condi-
tion for the ddcurvt to be more elastic than
the/) /) curve, and we shall assume that it
holds.
The condition can be violated if a(q) is
sufficiently higher than one. In this case, an
increase in n lowers q, and shifts demand
towards the monopolistic sector lo such an
extent that the demand curve for each firm
shifts to the right. However, this is rather
implausible.
Conventional Chamberlinian analysis as-
sumes a fixed demand curve for the group
as a whole. This amounts to assuming that
n-x is independent oi'n, i.e., that sipn -'^) is
independent of«. This will be so if ,t^  = 0, or
\f <T(q) = 1 lor ali q. The former is equiv-
alent to assuming thai p = 1, when ali
products in the group are perfect substi-
tutes, i.e., diversity is not valued at all. That
would be contrary to the intent of the whole
analysis. Thus, implicitly, conventional
analysis assumes (T{q) = I. This gives a con-
stant budget share for the monopolistically
competitive sector. Note that in our para-
metric formulation, this implies a unit-
elastic DD curve, (17) holds, and so equi-
librium is unique.
Finally, using (7), (11), and (16), we can
calculate the equilibrium output for each
active firm:
(18) X. = (ic
We can also write an expression for the
budget share ofthe group as a whole:
where q^ = p^n;^
These will be useful for subsequent com-
parisons.
C. Consirained Optimum
The next task is to compare the equi-
librium with a social optimum. With
economies of scale, the first best or uncon-
strained (really constrained only by tech-
nology and resource availability) optimum
requires pricing below average cost, and
therefore lump sum transfers to firms to
cover losses. The conceptual and practical
difficulties of doing so are clearly formid-
able. It would therefore appear that a more
appropriate notion of optimality is a con-
strained one, where each firm must have
nonnegative profits. This may be achieved
by regulation, or by excise or franchise
taxes or subsidies. The important restriction
is that lump sum subsidies are not available.
We begin with such a constrained opti-
mum. The aim is to choose «. /?,, and x, so
as lo maximize utility, satisfying the de-
mand functions and keeping the profit for
each firm nonnegative. The problem is
somewhat simplified by the result that all
active firms should have the same output
levels and prices, and should make exactly
zero profit. We omit ihe proof. Then we can
set/ = 1, and use (5) to express utility as a
function of q alone. This is of course a de-
creasing function. Thus the problem of
maximizing u becomes that of minimizing
</. i-t;.,
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mm pn
n,p
(25) -{a + (1 + = 0
subject to
(20) = a
To solve this, we calculate the logarithmic
marginal rate of substitution along a level
eurve of the objective, the similar rate of
transformation along ihe constraint, and
equate the two. This yields the condition
(21) p - c
+
I +
The second-order condition can be shown
to hold, and (21) simplifies to yield the price
for eaeh commodity produced in the con-
strained optimum, p,. as
(22) /?, = r(l + (i)
Comparing (15) and (22), we see that the
Iwo solutions have the same price. Since
they face the same break-even constraint,
they have the same number of firms as well,
and the values for all other variables can be
calculated from these two. Thus we have a
rather surprising case where the monopo-
listic competition equilibrium is identical
with the optimum constrained by the lack
of lump sum subsidies. Chamberlin once
suggested that such an equilibrium was "a
sort of ideal"; our analysis shows when and
in what sense this can be true.
D. Unconsl rained Optimum
These solutions can in turn be compared
to the unconstrained or first besi optimum.
Considerations of convexity again establish
that al! active firms should produce the
same output. Thus we are to choose n firms
each producing output v in order to maxi-
mize
(23) - n[a
where we have used the economy's resource
balance condition and (10). The firsl-order
conditions are
From the firsl stage ofthe budgeting prob-
lem, we know that q = UjL'o. Using (24)
and (10), we find the price charged by each
active firm in the unconstrained optimum,
/?„, equal to marginal cost
(26) p. = c
This, of course, is no surprise. Also from
the first-order conditions, we have
(27) X., =
Finally, wiih (26), each active firm covers its
variable cost exactly. The lump sum trans-
fers to firms then equal an. and therefore
1 = \ - an, and
,v = (I -an)
pn
The number of firms «„ is then defined by
(28) alii
1 - an.
We can now compare these magnitudes
with the corresponding ones in the equilib-
rium or Ihe constrained optimum. The most
remarkable result is that the output of each
active firm is the same in the two situations.
The fact that in a Chamberlinian equilib-
rium each firm operates to the left of the
point of minimum average cost has been
conventionally described by saying that
there is excess capacity. However, when
variety is desirable, i.e., when the different
products are not perfect substitutes, it is not
in general optimum to push the output of
each firm lo the point where all economies
of scale are exhausted.' We have shown in
one case that is not an extreme one. that the
first best optimum does not exploit econo-
mies of scale beyond the extent achieved in
the equilibrium. We can then easily con-
ceive of cases where the equilibrium exploits
economies of scale too far from the point of
view of social optimality. Thus our results
undermine the validity ofthe folklore of ex-
cess capacity, from the poinl of view ofthe
(24) + 0 Djvid Siarrctl.
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unconstrained optimum as well as the con-
strained one.
A direct comparison of the numbers of
firms from (16) and (28) would be difficult,
but an indirect argument turns out to be
simple. It is clear that the unconstrained
optimum has higher utility than the con-
strained optimum. Also, the level of lump
sum income in it is less than that in the lat-
ter. It must therefore be the case that
(29) < Qc =
Further, the difference must be large
enough that the budget constraint for XQ
and the quantity index y in the uncon-
strained case must lie outside that in the
constrained case in the relevant region, as
shown in Figure I. Let C be the constrained
optimum. A the unconstrained optimum,
and let B be the point where the line joining
the origin to C meets the indifference curve
in the unconstrained case. By homotheticity
the indifference curve at B is parallel to that
at C, so each ofthe moves from C to fi and
from B io A increases the value of >". Since
the value of x is the same in the two optima,
we must have
(30) «, > n, = n.
Thus the unconstrained optimum actually
allows more variety than the constrained
optimum and the equilibrium; this is
another point contradicting the folklore on
excessive diversity.
Using (29) we can easily compare the
budget shares. In the notation we have been
using, we find s^ § .v^  as d{q) ^ 0, i.e., as
a{q) $ 1 providing these hold over the en-
tire relevant range of q.
It is not possible to have a general result
concerning the relative magnitudes of .VQ in
the two situations; an inspection of Figure 1
shows this. However, we have a sufficient
condition:
(1 - anj{\ < \ - < I -
In this case the equilibrium or the con-
strained optimum use more of the nu-
meraire resource than the unconstrained
optimum. On the other hand, if a(^) = 0 we
have L-shaped isoquants, and in Figure I,
points A and B coincide giving the opposite
eonclusion.
In this section we have seen that with a
constant intrasector elasticity of substitu-
tion, the market equilibrium coincides with
the constrained optimum. We have also
shown that the unconstrained optimum has
a greater number of firms, each of the same
size. Finally, the resource allocation be-
tween the sectors is shown to depend on the
intersector elasticity of substitution. This
elasticity also governs conditions for
uniqueness of equilibrium and the second-
order conditions for an optimum.
Henceforth we will achieve some analytic
simplicity by making a particular assump-
tion about intersector substitution. In re-
turn, we will allow a more general form of
intrasector substitution.
II. Variable Elasticity Case
The utility function is now
with V increasing and concave. 0 < y < 1.
This is somewhat like assuming a unit inter-
sector elasticity of substitution. However,
this is not rigorous since the group utility
^U) ^ Z-K-v,) is not homothetic and there-
fore two-stage budgeting is not applicable.
It can be shown that the elasticity of the
i/f/curve in the large group case is
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(32) - d log X,
d log PI
for any /
This differs from the case of Section I in
being a iunclion of x,. To highlight the sim-
ilarities and the differences, we define ii{x)
by
(33) 1 +
Next, setting x, = x and /^ ^ = /? for / = 1.
2, . . . , n, we can write the DD curve and the








We assume that 0 < p(x) < I, and therefore
haveO < aj(x) < I.
Now consider the Chamberlinian equilib-
rium. The profit-maximization condition
for each active firm yields the common
equilibrium price/*, in terms ofthe common
equilibrium output x, as
(36) p, = c[\ + 0{Xt)\
Note the analogy with (15). Substituting
(36) in the zero pure profit condition, we
have x^ defined by
(37) ex., I
a + 1 +
Finally, the number of firms can be calcu-




For uniqueness of equilibrium we once
again use the conditions that the dd curve is
more elastic than the DD curve, and that
entry shifts the DD curve to the left. How-
ever, these conditions are rather involved
and opaque, so we omit them.
Let us turn to the constrained optimum.
We wish to choose n and x to maximize u,
subject to (34) and the break-even condition
px = a + ex. Substituting, we can express u
as a function of x alone:
(39) u =
a + ex
ypix) + (1 - 7)
The first-order condition defines x/.
(40)
ex,
Comparing this with (37) and using the
second-order condition, it can be shown
that provided p'{x) is one-signed for all x,
(41) X, ^ X, according as p'(x) $ 0
With zero pure profit in each case, the
points (x^, p^) and (x,, p,) He on the same
declining average cost curve, and therefore
(42) p, ^ Pt according as x^ J x.
Next we note that the dd curve is tangent to
the average cost curve at (x^, pt) and the
DD curve is steeper. Consider the case
X, > X,. Now the point (x^, Pc) must lie on a
DD curve further to the right than (x,, pj,
and therefore must correspond to a smaller
number of firms. The opposite happens if
x^  < X,. Thus,
(43) n, $ «s according as X, ^ x.
Finally, (41) shows that in both cases that
arise there, p(x^) < p(x^). Then u;(xj <
ijj(x^), and from (34),
(44) xo, > Xo,
A smaller degree of intersectoral substitu-
tion could have reversed the result, as in
Section I.
An intuitive reason for these results can
be given as follows. With our large group
assumptions, the revenue of each firm is
proportional to xv'(x). However, the con-
tribution of its output to group utility is
v(x). The ratio ofthe two is p(x). Therefore,
if p'(x) > 0, then at the margin each firm
finds it more profitable to expand than what
would be socially desirable, so x, > x^.
304 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 1977
Given the break-even constraint, this leads
to there being fewer firms.
Note that the relevant magnitude is the
elasticity of utility, and not the elasticity of
demand. The two are related, since
(45) p ' W 1
Thus, if p{x) is constant over an interval, so
is/i(A) and we have 1/(1 -\- ^) = p, which is
the case of Section I. However, if p{x)
varies, we eannot infer a relation between
the signs o{p'(x) and /3'(A). Thus the varia-
tion in the elasticity of demand is not in
general the relevant consideration. How-
ever, for important families of utility func-
tions there is a relationship. For example,
for v{x) = {k ^ mx)\ with m > 0 and 0 <
j < 1, we find that -xv"/v' and xv'/v are
positively related. Now we would normally
expect that as the number of commodities
produced increases, the elasticity of substi-
tution between any pair of them should in-
crease. In the symmetric equilibrium, this is
just the inverse of the elasticity of marginal
utility. Then a higher x would correspond
to a lower n, and therefore a lower elasticity
of substitution, higher -xv"/v' and higher
xv'/v. Thus we are led to expect that p'{x) >
0, i.e., that the equilibrium involves fewer
and bigger firms than the constrained opti-
mum. Once again the common view con-
cerning excess capacity and excessive di-
versity in monopolistic competition is called
into question.
The unconstrained optimum problem is
to choose n and x to maximize
(46) u = [rtv(j:)]''[l - n(a + cx)]^-^








Then we can use the second-order condition
to show that
This is in each case transitive with (41), and
therefore yields similar output comparisons
between the equilibrium and the uncon-
strained optimum.
The price In the unconstrained optimum
is of course the lowest of the three. As to
the number of firms, we note
a + ex, a + cx^
and therefore we have a one-way compari-
son:
(51) < x^, then n^ >
(50) jff according as P'(A:) ^ 0
Similarly for the equilibrium. These leave
open the possibility that the unconstrained
optimum has both bigger and more firms.
That is not unreasonable; after ali the un-
constrained optimum uses resources more
efficiently.
III. Asymmetric Cases
The discussion so far imposed symmetry
within the group. Thus the number of varie-
ties being produced was relevant, but any
group of n was just as good as any other
group of n. The next important modifica-
tion is to remove this restriction. It is easy
to see how interrelations within the group
of commodities can lead to biases. Thus, if
no sugar is being produced, the demand for
coffee may be so low as to make its produc-
tion unprofitable when there are set-up
costs. However, this is open to the objection
that with complementary commodities,
there is an incentive for one entrant to pro-
duce both. However, problems exist even
when alt the commodities are substitutes.
We illustrate this by considering an industry
which will produce commodities from one
of two groups, and examine whether the
choice ofthe wrong group is possible.**
Suppose there are two sets of commodi-
ties beside the numeraire, the two being per-
fect substitutes for each other and each hav-
ing a constant elasticity subutility function.
Further, we assume a constant budget share
*For an alternative approach using partial equilib-
rium methods, see Spence.
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We assume that each firm in group i has a
fixed cost fl, and a constant marginal cost c,.
Consider two types of equilibria, only
one commodity group being produced in
each. These are given by




Equation (53a) is a Nash equilibrium if
and only if it does not pay a firm to produce
a commodity of the second group. The de-









= s\\ - —] < 02
SC2(54) 1^




Now consider the optimum. Both the ob-
jective and the constraint are such as to lead
the optimum to the production of com-
modities from only one group. Thus, sup-
pose n, commodities from group i are being
produced at levels x, each, and offered at
prices/»,. The utility level is given by
(56) u = xMxiwI^'^i
and the resource availability constraint is
(57)
Given the values of the other variables, the
level curves of u in («], /I2) space are con-
cave to the origin, while the constraint is
linear. We must therefore have a corner
optimum. (As for the break-even con-
straint, unless the two 17, = p/ir*^' are equal,
the demand for commodities in one group
is zero, and there is no possibility of avoid-
ing a loss there.)
Note that we have structured our ex-
ample so that if the correct group is chosen,
the equilibrium will not introduce any
further biases in relation to the constrained
optimum. Therefore, to find the constrained
optimum, we only have to look at the
values of u, in (53a) and (53b) and see which
is the greater. In other words, we have to
see which q, is the smaller, and choose the
situation (which may or may not be a Nash
equilibrium) defined in (53a) and (53b) cor-
responding to it.
Figure 2 is drawn to depict the possible
equilibria and optima. Given all the rele-
vant parameters, we calculate (q[, Q2) from
(53a) and (53b). Then (54) and (55) tell us
whether either or both of the situations are
possible equilibria, while a simple compari-
son of the magnitudes of ^, and 2^ te'ls us
which is the constrained optimum. In the
figure, the nonnegative quadrant is split
into regions in each of which we have one
combination of equilibria and optima. We
only have to locate the point (^i, ^2) '" this
space to know the result for the given
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sCjAs-a^)
FIGURE 2. SOLUTIONS LABLLED I
EQUATION (53a): SOLUTIONS
REKER TO RgUATlON {53b)
TO
parameter values. Moreover, we can com-
pare the location ofthe points correspond-
ing to different parameter values and thus
do some comparative statics.
To understand the results, we must ex-
amine how q^ depends on the relevant
parameters. It is easy to see that each is an
increasing function of a, and c,- We also
find
(58)
and we expect this to be large and negative.
Further, we see from (9) that a higher {3,
corresponds to a lower own-price elasticity
of demand for each commodity in that
group. Thus ^, is an increasing function of
this elasticity.
Consider initially a symmetric situation,
with SCJ(S - fl|) ^ SC2/is - (32), fj^ = 1^2
(the region G vanishes then), and suppose
the point (^|, ^.) is on the boundary be-
tween regions A and B. Now consider a
change in one parameter, say, a higher own-
elasticity for commodities in group 2. This
raises ^2. moving the point into region A,
and it becomes optimal to produce com-
modities from group 1 alone. However,
both (53a) and (53b) are possible Nash
equilibria, and it is therefore possible that
the high elasticity group is produced in equi-
librium when the low elasticity one should
have been. If the difference in elasticities is
large enough, the point moves into region
C, where (53b) is no longer a Nash equilib-
rium. But, owing to the existence of a fixed
cost, a significant difference in elasticities is
necessary before entry from group I com-
modities threatens to destroy the "wrong"
equilibrium. Similar remarks apply to re-
gions Sand D.
Next, begin with symmetry once again,
and consider a higher r, or a^. This in-
creases^, and moves the point into region
B, making it optimal to produce the low-
cost group alone while leaving both (53a)
and (53b) as possible equilibria, until the
difference in costs is large enough to take
the point to region D. The change also
moves the boundary between A and C up-
ward, opening up a larger region G, but
that is not of significance here.
If both 1^ and 2^ are large, each group is
threatened by profitable entry from the
other, and no Nash equilibrium exists, as in
regions £ and F. However, the criterion of
constrained optimality remains as before.
Thus we have a case where it may be neces-
sary to prohibit entry in order to sustain the
constrained optimum.
If we combine a case where c, > C2 (or
a, > Qj) and &\ > ^2. ie-, where commodi-
ties in group 2 are more elastic and have
lower costs, we face a still worse possibility.
For the point (^1, cfi) ma> then lie in region
G, where only (53b) is a possible equilib-
rium and only (53a) is constrained opti-
mum, i.e., the market can produce only a
low cost, high demand elasticity group of
commodities when a high cost, low demand
elasticity group should have been produced.
Very roughly, the point is that although
commodities in inelastic demand have the
potential for earning revenues in excess of
variable costs, they also have significant
consumers' surpluses associated with them.
Thus it is not immediately obvious whether
the market will be biased in favor of them
or against them us compared with an opti-
mum. Here we find the latter, and inde-
pendent findings of Michael Spence in other
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contexts confirm this. Similar remarks
apply lo differences in marginal costs.
in the interpretation of the model with
heterogenous consumers and social indil-
ference curves, inelastically demanded com-
modities will be the ones which are inten-
sively desired by a few consumers. Thus we
have an "economic" reason why the market
will lead to a bias against opera relative to
football matches, and a justification for
subsidization of the former and a tax on the
latter, provided the distribution of income
is optimum.
Even when cross elasticities are zero,
there may be an incorrect choice of com-
modities to be produced (relative either to
an unconstrained or constrained optimum)
as Figure 3 illustrates. Figure 3 illustrates
a case where commodity A has a more
elastic demand curve than commodity fi; A
is produced in monopolistically competitive
equilibrium, while B is not. But clearly, it
is socially desirable to produce B, since ig-
noring consumer's surplus it is just mar-
ginal. Thus, the commodities that arc nol
produced but ought to be are those with in-
elastic demands. Indeed, if. as in the usual
analysis of monopolistic competition, elimi-
nating one firm shifts the demand curve for
the other firms to the right (i.e., increases





sumer surplus from A (at its equilibrium
level of output) is less than that from B
(i.e.. the cross hatched area exceeds the
striped area), then constrained Pareto opti-
mality entails restricting the production of
the commodity with the more elastic
demand.
A similar analysis applies to commodities
wiih the same demand curves but different
cost structures. Commodity A is assumed to
have the lower fixed cost but the higher
marginal cost. Thus, the average cost curves
cross but once, as in Figure 4. Commodity
A is produced in monopolistically com-
petitive equilibrium, commodity B is not
(although il is just at the margin of being
produced). But again, observe that B should
be produced, since there is a large con-
sumer's surplus; indeed, since were it lo be
produced. B would produce at a much
higher level than A, there is a much larger
consumer's surplus. Thus if the government
were to forbid the production of /I, B
would be viable, and social welfare would
increase.
In the comparison between constrained
Pareto optimality and the monopolistically
competitive equilibrium, we have observed
that in the former, we replace some low
fixed cost-high marginal cost commodities
with high fixed cost-low marginal cost com-
modities, and we replace some commodities
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with elastic demands with commodities with
inelastic demands.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We have constructed in this paper some
models to study various aspects of the rela-
tionship between market and optimal re-
source allocation in the presence of some
nonconvexities, The following general con-
clusions seem worth pointing out.
The monopoly power, which is a neces-
sary ingredient of markets with noncon-
vexities, is usually considered to distort
resources away from the sector concerned.
However, in our analysis monopoly power
enables firms to pay fixed costs, and entry
cannot be prevented, so the relationship be-
tween monopoly power and the direction of
market distortion is no longer obvious.
In the central case of a constant elasticity
utility function, the market solution was
constrained Parelo optimal, regardless of
the value of that elasticity (and thus the
implied elasticity of the demand functions).
With variable elasticities, the bias could go
either way, and the direction of the bias de-
pended not on how the elasticity of demand
changed, but on how the elasticity of utility
changed. We suggested that there was some
presumption that the market solution
would be characterized by loo few firms in
the monopolistically competitive sector.
With asymmetric demand and cost condi-
tions we also observed a bias against com-
modities with inelastic demands and high
costs.
The general principle behind these results
is that a market solution considers profit at
the appropriate margin, while a social opti-
mum lakes into account the consumer's sur-
plus. However, applications of this principle
come lo depend on details of cost and de-
mand functions. We hope that the cases
presented here, in conjunction with other
studies cited, offer some useful and new
insights.
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